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EEC Competition Law: Business Issues and Legal Principles in Common
Market Antitrust Cases. By U. P. Toepke. New York, New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1982. Pp. 925.
EEC competition law can be a strange and baffling creature for an
observer familiar only with United States antitrust law. There is a ten-
dency to make very straight-forward comparisons between these two sys-
tems. Each system is part of a federal structure of legal regulation which
applies to practices capable of affecting trade between member states. In
addition, both the Sherman Act' and the Treaty of Rome2 establish a
two-part scheme for regulating competition with different standards in
judging agreements between firms on the one hand, and the actions of
monopolists or dominant firms on the other hand. Like sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act,3 articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty4 are phrased
in broad sweeping language with the burden on the judiciary to fill in the
details in creating a comprehensive legal regime.'
A casual observer would have a great deal of difficulty cataloging
the differences and similarities between the two systems. For example,
while article 85 of the Rome Treaty has certain parallels with section 1 of
the Sherman Act, its very language prohibits concerted practices beyond
the reach of even the most expansive interpretation of section 1 of the
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
3 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
4 Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 85, at 47. Article 86
of the Treaty of Rome prohibits an abuse of a "dominant position." Id., art. 86, at 48.
5 The origin of the Sherman Act in the United States common law doctrine of restraint of trade
explains the willingness in the U.S. to delegate broad authority to the judiciary to guide the develop-
ments of the antitrust laws. See Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
"Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEx. L. REV. 661 (1982).
In the European Economic Community, the European Court of Justice has played an equally
critical role by extending the scope of the Treaty of Rome provisions to cover vertical restraints,
mergers, and a variety of predatory and exclusionary practices.
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Sherman Act.6
Another difficulty comes in analyzing article 86 of the Rome Treaty
which prohibits the "abuse" of a dominant position and is widely per-
ceived as different, and perhaps weaker, than section 2 of the Sherman
Act. These differences have been greatly exaggerated. Because recent
cases under section 2 have begun to emphasize the bad acts of the mo-
nopolist,7 United States monopolization law has moved toward the Euro-
pean concept of "abuse" as the key to a finding of illegality. Since article
86 applies to firms with a dominant position, rather than merely with a
monopoly position, it can be argued that the European system may well
be farther reaching than its United States counterpart.
The most fundamental difference exists in the very purpose of the
competition laws of each system. The antitrust laws of the United States
are based on a notion that competition is valuable for its own sake.' The
Treaty of Rome also recognizes this aim, but only as a subsidiary goal to
the achievement of an integrated European common market. The Rome
Treaty itself explains the significance of competition law in achieving this
broader goal:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stabil-
ity, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between its Member States.9
To this end, the Treaty mandates "the establishment of a system ensur-
ing that competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market."' 0
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty are functional instruments of
economic integration. Practices illegal under these provisions are pro-
6 Compare ACF Chemifarma v. Commission, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 661 with Theatre
Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
7 See,e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287-88
(2d Cir. 1979),cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See generally Waller, The "New"Law of Monopo-
lization: An Examination of MCl Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegrah Co. 32
DEPAUL L. REV. 595 (1983).
8 The debate in the U.S. is whether to define that competition in economic, social or political
terms. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 65 (1982); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979);
Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979);
Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Anti-
trust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
9 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 2, at 15.
tO Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 3(f), at 16.
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hibited as "incompatible with the Common Market.""1 This is a role
that the Sherman Act need not play. Even at the time of the enactment
of the first national antitrust laws in 1890, the creation of a national
economy was largely complete. Articles 85 and 86, along with other pro-
visions of the Treaty,12 must therefore play the same role as did the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution 13 during the nineteenth
century. Appreciating this function of EEC competition laws clarifies
the two crucial distinctions between the European and the United States
systems: the inexorable hostility of the EEC to any form of territorial
protection or export prohibitions and the existence of article 85(3) ex-
emptions for restrictive agreements which serve other interests of the
Community.
Even stripped of the comparisons with United States law, EEC com-
petition law is fascinating for its institutional aspects. It is the most fully
developed and most effective of any of the Community's policies. In
comparison, the common transportation policy languishes in administra-
tive turmoil and national obstinance,14 while the common energy policy
is virtually non-existent.1 5
The competition regime owes its success to the dual system of public
and private enforcements of rights derived from articles 85 and 86. On
the public side, the competition laws are enforced by the European Com-
mission, a powerful and professional administrative body not directly
embroiled in the politics of national interest as practiced by the Council
of Ministers. 6 The power of the Commission to investigate, initiate pro-
ceedings, and grant negative clearances as well as exemptions under arti-
cle 85(3) give it an enormous ability to influence the development of EEC
competition law.
The role of the Commission is complemented by the ability of pri-
vate parties to invoke rights derived from articles 85 and 86. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice has held that articles 85 and 86 have direct effect
11 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 85 & 86, at 47-49.
12 Of particular significance in this regard are the provisions concerning the free movement of
goods. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 30-34, at 26-28.
13 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14 See A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, PARRY & HARDY: EEC LAW 295-311 (2d ed. 1981).
15 Id. at 412-18.
16 The European Commission was created pursuant to Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty
of Rome, supra note 2, art. 4, at 16. Its general powers are derived from articles 155 through 163,
and numerous other specific Treaty provisions. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 155-163, at 71-
73. Unlike the Council of Ministers, the Commission is a Community institution without specific
national identification.
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and could be enforced by private parties in national courts.17 Until re-
cently, this has meant that litigants used articles 85 and 86 as a defense to
a breach of an agreement with restrictive conditions or occasionally to
seek injunctive relief against predatory practices such as refusals to
supply.
Within the past year, there has also been the promise of articles 85
and 86 as a plaintiff's weapon in a suit for damages. The highest court in
England, the British House of Lords, held in an interlocutory appeal that
damages were available under article 85 in a suit alleging a refusal to
supply. 8 Although the product of a national court, this ruling is likely
to have wide-reaching implications for the Community since it is based
on the doctrine of direct effect which has authorized suits for damages
for breaches of other Community obligations.' 9
The comparative and institutional aspects of European competition
policy have been the source of rich scholarship on both sides of the At-
lantic. In addition to theoretical study, the existence of a sophisticated
competition system is of great practical interest to United States firms
who manufacture, sell, or license in the Common Market, and the law-
yers who advise them. Both of these groups are the intended audience
for Utz Toepke's handbook, EEC Competition Law .20
EEC Competition Law is intended as a comprehensive treatise of
both depth and breadth. It is organized into eight parts. The substantive
content of the introductory chapters is limited to a very short description
of the evolution of the Community and the doctrine of direct effect as set
forth by the European Court of Justice. Part 2 is devoted to an analysis
of articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty and a short discussion of the
extraterritorial application of EEC competition law. This section is a
largely straight-forward parsing of the language of the Treaty, emphasiz-
ing the elasticity inherent in such concepts as "concerted practices," '2 1
"effect on trade between the Member States,"' 22 and "abuse" of a "domi-
nant position." 23
The principal shortcoming of part 2 comes in Toepke's analysis of
17 See Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51 (preliminary
ruling).
18 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 770.
19 Id. at 775 (opinion of Lord Diplock).
20 U. TOEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW: BUSINESS ISSUES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN COM-
MON MARKET ANTITRUST CASES (1982) [hereinafter cited as EEC COMPETITION LAW].
21 Id. at 31-35.
22 Id. at 39-43, 92-95.
23 Id. at 79-92.
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article 85(3), a provision permitting the European Commission to exempt
otherwise illegal anticompetitive practices
which contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of
goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress while reserv-
ing to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not
indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial proportion of the goods concerned. 24
Article 85(3) is the explicit recognition that competition policy rep-
resents an instrument of continued European integration and that on oc-
casion it must play a subservient role when it fails to promote further
integration. Article 85(3) permits the European Commission to consider
societal and Community values unrelated to competition in passing on
the legality of agreements and practices between undertakings. This is a
concept entirely foreign to United States observers, but absolutely crucial
to understanding EEC competition law and policy.
Unfortunately, Toepke muddles the working of article 85(3) in two
ways, the first an error of description, and the second a more serious
error of analysis. First, the language of article 85(3) mandates two posi-
tive conditions and two negative conditions which must be satisfied
before an exemption can be granted. The agreement or concerted prac-
tice must promote some form of enhanced efficiency or technical advance
and pass along to consumers a "fair share" of the benefits. At the same
time, the agreement or concerted practice must not contain unnecessary
restrictions on the firms involved nor result in the substantial elimination
of competition.2" For some reason, Toepke insists on referring to these
requirements as "the double twosome of prerequisites."26 This is an un-
fortunate and awkward phrase that obscures more than it explains.
The second and more serious error is Toepke's insistence that article
85(3) contains a European "rule of reason."27 This statement is simply
wrong and misapprehends the rule of reason in United States antitrust
law. The "rule of reason" is a rule of construction necessitated by the
broad sweep of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which declares that all
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade are ille-
gal.2" To avoid the absurdity of making most commercial contracts ille-
gal, the Supreme Court has held that under the rule of reason only
24 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 85(3), at 48.
25 Id.
26 EEC COMPETION LAW, supra note 20, at 57.
27 Id. at 56.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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agreements which unreasonably restrict competition violate section 1 of
the Sherman Act.29 More recently, Justice Stevens held in National Soci-
ety of Professional Engineers v. United States 30 that the inquiry under the
rule of reason is confined to a consideration of the impact of the chal-
lenged conduct on competition and does not inquire whether a policy
favoring competition is in the public interest.3 1
Article 85(3) is based on an entirely different rationale. Article
85(3) is not designed to determine whether a practice is sufficiently an-
ticompetitive to declare it illegal. Instead, it examines restraints already
illegal under article 85(1) and asks whether other societal goals dictate
that the particular restraint should be authorized nonetheless. 2 Limited
exemptions of this sort certainly exist in United States law,33 but should
not be confused with a rule of reason designed to separate the innocuous
agreement from the pernicious agreement on the basis of competitive
effect.
The heart of the book is an analysis of the legality of specific busi-
ness practices under articles 85 and 86, plus an overview of the proce-
dural aspects and enforcement of Community competition law. Part 3
discusses diverse forms of business conduct which are largely the prov-
ince of dominant firms regulated by article 86. 3' The sections that follow
discuss a large number of topics grouped loosely under the heading of
joint ventures, 35  distribution,36 pricing, 37  and intellectual property
rights.3 8 The analysis in these sections is generally sound, but the topics
covered are grouped in somewhat arbitrary fashion. 9
Because each chapter covers a very discrete and narrow topic, EEC
Competition Law has a certain utility as a reference source for the answer
to specific questions. It is, however, tiresome reading. Toepke's style is
29 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
30 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
31 Id. at 690, 692.
32 See generally B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 483-99 (1983).
33 The most prominent example is the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1982).
34 EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 20, at 103-61.
35 Id. at 163-287.
36 Id. at 289-473.
37 Id. at 479-577.
38 Id. at 579-675.
39 For example, there is a chapter on patent licensing separate from the larger section on intellec-
tual property rights. EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 20, at 349-81. In addition, most of the
topics discussed under reprehensible business conduct easily could have been dispersed in the later
sections to achieve a better focus. See Id. at 109-61.
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to rely on large amounts of introductory material." Each chapter begins
with a "perspective," followed by a discussion of the cases, ending with
some "observations" which largely duplicate the material in the earlier
perspective.
The discussion of the cases is particularly repetitious. Toepke be-
gins with a perfectly valid and concise statement of the law and then uses
excerpts of up to five cases quoting virtually the identical language used
in text. The practice of excerpting rather than editing becomes tiresome
when lengthy excerpts of several cases are used to illustrate a point al-
ready handled adequately in a paragraph or two of text. This is simply
an instance of insufficient and inadequate case selection and editing.
The problems of EEC Competition Law are compounded by the fact
that it is a prideful and boastful book, often condescending to the reader.
Toepke claims that his book fills a vacuum caused by the lack of a com-
prehensive review of European competition case law.41 He also claims
that his book is a unique blending of cases and commentary.42 Neither of
these claims is precisely accurate. There are any number of good trea-
tises in this area which must by virtue of their subject matter discuss
principles derived from cases, if not the cases themselves. These treatises
include Bellamy and Child's Common Market Law of Competition ,3 and
the more recent Competition Law of Britain and the Common Market by
Valentine Korah. 4 The best blending of commentary and cases in this
area remains the EEC section of Barry Hawk's United States, Common
Market & International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide.4" Toepke be-
gins his book with the, presumably rhetorical, question: "Why on earth
another book on the Common Market and its antitrust law?" 46 Nine
hundred pages later the reader is still inclined to ask, "Why indeed?"
Spencer Weber Waller*
40 Toepke spends a great deal of time introducing himself and his topic. There are two separate
sections describing the purpose of the book, in glowing terms, plus introduction at the beginning of
the book and at each chapter. Other minor but noticeable annoyances include the pointless empha-
sis of words and phrases throughout the text. Also, Toepke adds abstracts of the cases in the margin
much like case briefs done by first year law students.
41 EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 20, at vii, 13.
42 Id. Even if this were accurate, it is unclear why an extended discussion of cases would be of
interest or value to the businessman, half of Toepke's intended audience.
43 C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (2d ed. 1978).
44 V. KORAH, COMPETITION LAW OF BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET (3d rev. ed. 1982).
For a slightly dated treatise of value, see D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL & J. JAMES, EEC ANTI-TRUST
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1975).
45 HAWK, supra note 32.
46 EEC COMPETITION LAW, supra note 20, at vii.
* B.A. University of Michigan 1979, J.D. Northwestern University, 1982. Trial Attorney, An-
titrust Division, United States Department of Justice. The views expressed are solely those of the
reviewer and are not intended to represent those of the Antitrust Division.
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